WellBeing International

WBI Studies Repository
2019

Contesting Animal Experiments through Ethics and Epistemology:
In Defense of a Political Critique of Animal Experimentation
Arianna Ferrari
Futurium gGmbH

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/prosreth
Part of the Animal Studies Commons, Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons, and the Laboratory
and Basic Science Research Commons

Recommended Citation
Ferrari, A. (2019). Contesting Animal Experiments through Ethics and Epistemology: In Defense of a
Political Critique of Animal Experimentation. In Animal Experimentation: Working Towards a Paradigm
Change (pp. 194-206). Brill.

This material is brought to you for free and open access
by WellBeing International. It has been accepted for
inclusion by an authorized administrator of the WBI
Studies Repository. For more information, please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

CHAPTER 7
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1

Introduction

Generally, an animal experiment can be defined as an intervention on an
animal, which causes suffering, harm, and distress, for scientific purposes. In
this definition, animal experiments differ from more general scientific inves
tigations concerning animals, such as observational studies in the wild in the
fields of ethology or conservation, in which animals are involved but may not
be harmed. Nowadays, the use of the term vivisection, in the case of animal ex
periments, is very controversial. This term originally referred to the cutting of
living bodies for scientific purposes and has a long conceptual history (Maehle,
1992). In ancient times, it was used for referring to experiments on animals
as well as on humans. Only in modern times, it became a colloquial term for
all animal experiments and was much used by opponents in the nineteenth
century, as the criticism of animal experiments became organized in a politi
cal movement (Maehle, 1990). Many opponents to animal experiments, nowa
days, use the term deliberately in a political sense, connecting to past animal
protection movements (e.g., the international Citizens' Initiative Stop Vivisec
tion, cf. Rippe, 2009). Animal experimenters, on the other hand, oppose the
term on the grounds that there is no chirurgical exploration of living animals
in experiments ( e.g., German Research Foundation, DFG, 2016).
Currently, animals are used in different ways for scientific purposes: they
are used in basic research; in education in a variety of biomedical disciplines,
including veterinary medicine; as so-called disease models, to mimic different
diseases, mostly human ones; as test subjects in different test settings; in vet
erinary medicine; in behavioral and cognitive ethological studies; as bioreac
tors to produce fluids or bodily parts which contain therapeutic substances
for human beings (i.e., "gene-pharming"); and as sources of cells, tissues, and
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organs for human transplantation. Although the capturing, handling, trans
porting, confining, and breeding of animals are relevant parts of the practice
of animal experimentation, they are not explicitly indicated in many laws as
animal experiments. This constitutes a problem because these practices cause
major distress in animals. Furthermore, the act of breeding animals for sci
entific purposes, which has become unavoidable (with rare exceptions), since
it ensures the standardization and reproducibility of experimental results (cf.
Ferrari, 2008), must be considered an ethical issue. In the practice of animal
experimentation, individuals are materially formed in their identity as experi
mental living beings. These animals are often born with specific characteris
tics suited to scientific experiments (see Linzey and Linzey, 2015). The fact that
breeding is not classified as an animal experiment affects the perception of the
suffering and the number of animals used for research. For example, in experi
ments that make use of genetically altered animals, many individuals are used
for the realization and maintenance of a, so-called, transgenic animal line, and
are not counted in the statistics. Furthermore, many transgenic lines are bred
in commercial facilities to be ready for use, so that scientists can order them
from a catalogue.
This chapter offers a framework for building a convincing critique of animal
experimentation. In order to do so, it first explores the framework that justifies
animal experiments in the current debate, which relies both on scientific and
ethical arguments. It then analyzes the main arguments developed to oppose
animal experiments, in terms of epistemic and ethical arguments. Although
valuable, these arguments present some pitfalls when considered separately.
The chapter concludes that a convincing critique of animal experimentation
must be political.

2

How Is the Practice of Animal Experiments Currently Justified?

Although animal experiments are carried out all over the world, in most cases
their use is not mandatory. Their main goal is to protect human beings, though
protecting non-human animal health and the environment are also goals. This
chapter presents the argument that the obligation to perform animal experi
ments comes from a commonly accepted experimental culture, which is justi
fied on the basis of ethical and epistemic arguments relating to human gains.
In the writings which justify animal experiments, often the need to protect
human safety is of primary concern. The apparent unavoidability of animal
experiments is explained, first through reference to historical arguments and,
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second, through the irreducibility of, so-called, in vivo experiments to other
methods (e.g., in vitro, in silico, or computer modelling). For example, the Royal
Society (2004) has argued that almost every medical achievement in the twen
tieth century relied on the use of animals in some way. The German Research
Foundation (DFG, 2016), in its paper on animal experiments, maintains that
even sophisticated computers are unable to model interactions between mol
ecules, cells, tissues, organs, organisms, and the environment. It is argued that
animal experiments result from a cost-benefit-analysis, in which the costs for
animals have to be balanced with the benefits for the protection of human
health and the environment.
The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique (Russell and Burch, 1959)
is one of the first documents on the ethical rationale of animal experiments
and has become a milestone in the politics of alternative methods. Russell
and Burch formed the basis for a new applied science that would improve or
substitute the treatment of laboratory animals, while advancing the quality
of science in studies that use animals. They claimed that this science must be
inspired by the three principles of replacement, reduction, and refinement with
regard to the use of animals. It is important to note that Russell and Burch's
intent was ethical, but their methods were descriptive and empirical, not nor
mative. Russell and Burch were inspired by the goal, stated by the Universities
Federation for Animal Welfare (uFAw) in the United Kingdom, to promote, so
called, humane behavior, consisting of reducing pain and fear inflicted upon
animals (Tannenbaum and Bennett, 2015). The method of replacing, reducing,
or refining the use of animals in studies was defined as an empirical approach.
According to this method, inhumanity was associated with physical or psycho
logical distress, unnecessary or avoidable pain, fear, stress, anxiety, and bodi
ly discomfort. However, for Russell and Burch, the goal of lessening distress
(inhumanity) in scientific procedures was always subordinate to the goals of
conducting science and achieving scientific and medical progress. Russell and
Burch, indeed, were not criticizing the use of animals in research as such, but
promoted methods to reduce and, whenever possible, eliminate animal dis
tress consistent with the conduct of sound science. Although the concept of
alternatives was not present in their 1959 book, the 3Rs have been the founda
tion for the development of alternative methods, which were formally intro
duced by Smyth (1978) in Alternatives to Animal Experiments (see Tannenbaum
and Bennet, 2015). Smyth defined an alternative as any change in experimental
methods that results in the application of the 3Rs. Since then, there has been
an ongoing debate on the different definitions of these principles and how to
apply them to scientific procedures (see e.g., Tannenbaum and Bennett, 2015);
but the core of the message remains in favor of animal experiments. Indeed,
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more recently, Russell described the word alternative as "unfortunate" because
it suggests only 1R (Russell, 2005).
The justification of animal experiments has been explained in the clearest
and strongest manner in the case of biomedical research. One of the most
quoted documents is the Nuremberg Code, which followed the Nuremberg
Trials after World War 11. The Nuremberg Code states that, "The experiment
should be so designed and based on the results of animal experimenta
tion and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other prob
lem under study that the anticipated results will justify the performance
of the experiment" (Shuster, 1997, p. 1436). Another widely used document
is the Declaration of the World Medical Association on the Ethical Principles
for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, first formulated in Helsinki in
1964 (World Medical Association, 1964). This Declaration was formulated as
a response to the monstrous threats to humanity during World War 11, and
it defined the role of animal experiments prior to human exposure: "Medical
research involving human subjects must conform to generally accepted scien
tific principles, be based on a thorough knowledge of the scientific literature,
other relevant sources of information, and adequate laboratory and, as ap
propriate, animal experimentation. The welfare of animals used for research
must be respected". Now known as the Helsinki Declaration, it establishes the
ethical obligation to carry out animal experiments when results from these
experiments are necessary and unavoidable at a given time by the scientific
community.
In 2010, inspired by the Helsinki Declaration, which changed the landscape
of human experimentation, a group of scientists (approximately 4500 individ
uals, at the time of writing) formulated the Basel Declaration (2010) "to further
advance the implementation of ethical principles such as the 3Rs whenever
animals are being used and to call for more trust, transparency and commu
nication on the sensitive topic of animals in research". The Basel Declaration
states the necessity of animal experiments to meet fundamental scientific
challenges (such as human and non-human animal diseases and protection of
the environment), and that the necessity will remain in the foreseeable future
for biomedical research. The first principle of the Basel Declaration is "to re
spect and protect the animals entrusted to us and not inflict unnecessary pain,
suffering, or harm to them by adhering to highest standards of experimental
design and animal care". This is very similar in scope and intent to the 3Rs.
The principles that follow provide specific care in particular scientific prac
tices, such as the creation and use of genetically modified animals or the use of
animals in education (Basel Declaration, 2010). The German Research Founda
tion (DFG) explains the ethics of animal experimentation through, so-called,

Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
Downloaded from Brill.com11/11/2019 09:57:0BPM
via free access

198

FERRARI

patho-inclusive ethics, which they define as follows: "It is not only reconcilable
with valuing human interests over those of sentient animals but also with the
position that other human interests, such as life and health, knowledge gain,
and pleasure may justify causing distress to animals. Moreover, this view does
not preclude the killing of animals, but it does demand that the killing should
not cause fear or suffering, if possible" (DFG, 2016, p. 43).
In these texts, the argument that justifies animal research relies on the
ethical obligation of a profession, which considers the performance of animal
experiments the best scientific standard. In other words, the standard of ac
cepting and promoting some animal experiments is described as a scientific
standard, since animal experiments are considered the epistemically best way
to achieve certain goals. In addition, the commitment of maintaining good
animal welfare is an ethical concern but always subordinate to that of the best
science. However, it is not only the professional obligation of scientists to use
the best standards at a given time which justifies animal experiments. The pro
fessional obligation is based on a more general framework on human-animal
relationships, which is anthropocentric at its core. It is a form of (unqualified)
speciesism, i.e., the unjustified disadvantageous treatment or consideration
of those who do not belong to, or are not categorized as belonging to, a cer
tain species (or group of species). Richard Frey (2005) refers to this position
as guided by the "argument from benefit" that is derived from utilitarianism,
which justifies the infliction of pain on animals to serve different goals, and is
combined with speciesism, which states that a species belonging (i.e. human)
justifies a different ethical treatment. Indeed, in the case of animals, the cost
benefit-analysis is accepted; whereas, in the case of humans, it is not: "utilitari
anism for animals, Kantianism for people," as Nozick (1974, p. 39) put it. Cohen
(1986) offers a similar defense for animal experiments. Contesting the idea of
animal rights because animals lack the capacity to make moral claims, Cohen
has argued that we have a strong duty to conduct such experiments to alleviate
human suffering and extend human lives.
In summary, defense of animal research is derived from a combination of
scientific reasons (the best possible standard at a given time), the ethical obli
gation of scientists as a professional community (to respect the best possible
standards), and speciesism. Although the arguments for animal experiments
are accepted by many in society, particularly in terms of regulations and exper
imental practice, arguments against animal experiments have a long history
and have been articulated in different texts and campaigns worldwide. The
following sections distinguish between two main arguments against animal
experimentation, epistemic (also called, epistemic antivivisectionism) and ethi
cal (also called, ethical antivivisectionism).
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The Epistemic Critique of Animal Experiments

At the core of the epistemic critique of animal experiments is the idea that
such experiments are bad science. Bad is used as a synonym for inefficient, sci
entifically wrong, or misleading. This kind of critique has a long history. Be
tween the third and fourth centuries, BCE, the empiric school of the Ancient
Greek rejected the study of anatomical and physiological vivisection, due both
to its cruelty and the belief that pain and death would distort the normal ap
pearance of internal organs. In more recent times, some animal welfare and
animal rights organizations and philosophers have used examples from the
history of biomedical experimentation, and retrospective studies on the influ
ence of animal experiments in human medicine, to criticize the practice. The
Italian philosopher, Croce (2000), coined the term, scientific antivivisectionism
(antivivisezionismo scientifico ), as a rejection of the idea of the transferability
of results from one species to another. According to this rationale, modern
animal models are of limited use and can even be dangerous because the data
produced are not easily translatable to humans (Croce, 2000; Gericke and Re
inke, 2011; cf. Pappworth, 1968).
For Lafollette and Shanks (1996) and Greek and Greek (2003) the idea of
the unavoidability of animal experiments is misleadingly taken as the "gold
standard" within the scientific community. At the center of this critique is the
deconstruction of the claim that animal experiments in biomedicine are pre
dictive of human conditions. Lafollette and Shanks (2004; 2006) provide a cri
tique of the use of animal models based on evolutionary theory. They observe
that phylogenetically related animals have different mechanisms to achieve
the same biological functions, a phenomenon they call "causal-functional
asymmetry". This phenomenon renders cross-species extrapolations as causal
explanations impossible. Knowledge of relevant causal differences, i.e., causal
dis-analogies (with respect to mechanisms and pathways), which compro
mise the usefulness of analogical reasoning, is necessary; however, this knowl
edge is only possible retrospectively, once a property has already been tested
on different species. Lafollette and Shanks (1996) argue that the defense of
animal experimentation relies on a scientifically misleading interpretation
of the epistemic role of animal models in biomedical research. They explain
that this defense is a product of Claude Bernard's legacy, which is based on
a hypothetical-deductivist method in biomedicine, coupled with a rejection
of statistical laws. Bernard assumed that clinical medicine (including epide
miological studies) could never be a genuine science and believed in the in
terchangeability of species to test clinical hyp otheses (Lafollette and Shanks,
1996).
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The argument defending the unavoidability of animal experiments is based
on the confusion between what are known as causal-analogic models (cAMs)
and hypothetical animal models (HAMs). Historically, some animal experi
ments were consistent with hypothetical-deductive methods, in that they were
useful to gain knowledge. However, in the present day, with scientific and tech
nical advancements in alternative methods, the potential of molecular biology
(together with proteomics and genomics, among others), as well as computer
models, animal models have become obsolete and poor scientific practice.
As a result, scientists who promote animal models are not adhering to good
scientific practice, and continued use of animal models may prevent the at
tainment of human-relevant results. This critique is apparent in the current
debate on the promotion of alternative methods within regulatory toxicology.
For example, Hartung (2013) has spoken of "toxic ignorance" and the necessity
for a paradigm shift in the twenty-first century that moves away from animal
use and embraces new non-animal technologies.
The epistemic critique of animal experiments is supported by considerable
literature from retrospective studies, which have established the poor clini
cal value of animal models (Pound et al., 2004). Though beyond the scope of
this chapter, this literature reaches a sobering conclusion that, in many cases,
animal experiments show poor methodological quality, problems with evalu
ation, and limitations of false-positive or false-negative results. Furthermore,
there is a visible lack of consistency between the results of animal models and
clinical trials, as well as a significant lack of transferability of results (Akhtar,
2015; Knight, 2011). This demonstrates the need for a retrospective evaluation
and critical appraisal of the benefits of animal experiments to facilitate a para
digm shift towards non-animal and human-relevant approaches.

4

The Ethical Critique of Animal Experiments

The ethical critique of animal experiments is derived from reflection on the
moral status of animals as sentient beings: animal experiments impose suf
fering and death, so that the animals' interests are systematically violated.
Hence, this practice is not justified, regardless of its "utility". This kind of cri
tique can be traced to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when a rise
in movements opposing cruelty to animals occurred, and men of letters in
England denounced the brutality of animal experiments and openly opposed
the Cartesian view of animals as automata (Maehle, 1990). The ethical cri
tique of animal experiments explicitly denounces speciesism: "There is only
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one serious moral defense of vivisection. That defense proceeds as follows.
Human beings are better off because of vivisection. [ ... ] One thing should be
immediately obvious. The benefits argument has absolutely no logical bear
ing on the debate over animal rights. Clearly, all that the benefits argument
could possibly show is that vivisection on nonhuman animals benefits human
beings. What this argument cannot show is that vivisecting animals for this
purpose is morally justified. Whether animals have rights is not a question
that can be answered by saying how much vivisection benefits human beings"
(Regan, 2004, p. 174).
The ethical critique attacks the cost-benefits of the animal model in two
ways: first, the thesis of inviolable animal rights (right to life and prohibition
of the infliction of suffering) intrinsically excludes the institutionalization of a
cost-benefit calculation (see Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011). Second, because
the ethical critique denounces that in animal experiments two incomparable
magnitudes are compared: the direct, intentional, present infliction and killing
of animals and the elaboration of methods to reach future anticipated knowl
edge that can principally serve to protect humans. In other words, a conflict
situation is constructed. Such attempts are part of a long-term strategy for the
further development of scientific goals (Wolf, 1988), by which (perhaps) the
suffering of some persons (or some animals) can be prevented; and they can
not, therefore, be viewed as a conflict of interest. In the institutionalized prac
tice of animal experiments, animals are born to be experimental tools, they are
bred for a purpose, and their biological nature is formed through the identity
given to them by human use. If we recognize animals as bearers of fundamen
tal rights, we cannot permit the institutionalization of a cost-benefit measure
that violates their life and causes them suffering. The practice of animal ex
perimentation is intrinsically unethical as it forges animals' identity, puts them
in confinement, restricts their species-specific traits, and kills them.

5

The Strengths and Pitfalls of the Epistemic and Ethical Critiques

Both the epistemic and the ethical arguments have a long history in the cri
tique of animal experiments. However, to facilitate a paradigm shift towards
ending animal experiments, one must understand the weaknesses of these
approaches. The epistemic critique of using animals strikes the scientific jus
tification of animal experiments at its core, because it argues that these meth
ods are simply not the best scientific standards at a given time. The rejection
of professional standards is a strong claim because, as previously explained,
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the argument in favor of animal experiments is built on professional ethics, in
which ethical obligations are derived from epistemic standards. However, in
an anti-speciesist framework, the apparent force of the epistemic argument
becomes a weakness. The epistemic critique is often too general and runs the
risk of making the same mistake as its opponents. There are cases in which
knowledge can be transferred from animals to human beings. Since this cri
tique contests a pro-animal experiment position on an empirical level, it runs
the risk of failure in cases that animal models may be valuable. LaFollette and
Shanks' (1994) critique of the predictability of animal models is based on bio
medical research; however, when applied to the field of basic research, as well
as cases of species-specific veterinary medicine, their argument is weaker (La
Follette and Shanks, 1996). The experimental system in basic research centers
on discovering new fields and new uses of knowledge. This characteristic, on
the one hand, can permit the elaboration of more complex alternative meth
ods that mimic dynamics and biological properties in efficient ways; however,
on the other hand, it also leads to the establishment of new fields and new uses
attached to animals.
The second problem with the epistemic critique to animal experiments is
that the rejection of speciesism appears to be subordinate to the argument of
utility. The epistemic critique is directed towards the benefit side of the cost
benefit-analysis but not the analysis in itself. The largest part of intended ben
efits is human gain. As previously discussed, the protection of human health
is the highest priority in the justification of animal use. Therefore, when dis
cussing animal experiments with a rationale, it is close to impossible to reject
them. It is important to note that scientists often acknowledge the limitations
of their work and express rather modest claims in terms of the applicability of
the outcomes of their studies. Nevertheless, they maintain that animal use is
necessary and important.
The ethical critique of animal experiments offers a strong case against ani
mal experiments, because it refuses to use a cost-benefit model, which priori
tizes human gains. However, the ethical critique is, at times, accused of not
explicitly addressing the potential loss of knowledge from renouncing animal
experiments. This is apparent in the accelerated development of non-animal
alternatives since the European ban on cosmetic testing on animals: "Past ex
perience demonstrates clearly that animal testing provisions in the cosmetics
legislation have been a key accelerator in relation to the development of alter
native methods and have sent a strong signal far beyond the cosmetics sector
and far beyond Europe" (European Commission, 2013, p. 6). The human spirit
is creative and to renounce particular strategies encourages other pathways of
discovering and working.
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Conclusion: For a Political Critique of Animal Experimentation

Why are animal experiments considered by some as fundamental and im
portant even though they have limitations? It is impossible to answer this
question with reference to empirical results alone. This question is more rel
evant to values and social goals. The praxis of animal research, of each kind
of experimental practice, is a practice in a given time and space in society,
and it is a reflection of epistemic and ethical values. Scientific practices are
not free of ethical values because: (1) they use limited cognitive and finan
cial resources (and thus it is always a matter of choice in which direction
these resources should go); and (2) research activities reflect our values; that
is, what we are willing to do in a society, what we consider as an acceptable
means to reach an end. When we accept the infliction of pain on and killing
of sentient beings, we embrace these values as a society. This is apparent in
the justification framework of the Declaration of Helsinki. Since the carrying
out of animal research is a matter of a professional ethics (despite the possibil
ity of adjustments if, for example, the experiments are not designed properly),
once these experiments meet current scientific standards, it is more difficult
to criticize them. Therefore, as long as the infliction of harm on animals is
justified, as long as animals are ontologically thought of as "research tools",
animal use continues. Thus, overconfidence in animal experiments as scientific
techniques is profoundly linked with an instrumental view of animals and life
in general.
The fundamental decision on the acceptability of the infliction of suffering
and the killing of animals is a reflection of a social order and, of course, not
solely a matter of empirical evidence. As a result, the necessity or inevitability
of a scientific experiment is always a product of decisions and negotiations in
a society. In the case of human clinical trials, there are also considerations of
possible benefits and costs (in term of risks for the patient); but the situation
is fundamentally different because the life and well-being of human beings is
considered more significant than those of animals. For example, in the ethi
cal literature about human clinical trials, the language used to contest some
experiments is fundamentally different, and it often refers to vulnerabilities
and possible abuses of particular populations and groups. The vulnerability of
animals, in contrast, is simply taken for granted in the experimental system.
Inasmuch as the idea of human exceptionalism is a political idea (ideology),
the possibility of strictly distinguishing epistemic reasons from ethical reasons
permits a division of moral labor (e.g., "I conduct science and do not engage
with ethical problems, it is not in my field of expertise"), which is highly prob
lematic and, therefore, rejected for human clinical trials.
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The dispute on animal experiments cannot be a dispute on (objective) ben
efits; it is a dispute on what we as a society want to justify as practices and how
we treat the living beings who are a part of it. Science and its practices are a
social project. Can humankind benefit from animal abuse? This fundamental
political nature of the category of necessity calls for a political critique of ani
mal experiments, a critique that combines both the ethical and the epistemic
critical arguments, acknowledging the non-neutrality of scientific decisions.
An ethical critique to animal use is weaker, if it is not combined with a cri
tique of the system of experimentation, i.e. the epistemic culture of animal
experiments. At the same time, the epistemic critique should free itself from
the reference to the category of utility as if it were solely a matter of scientific
evidence; resulting in an impasse in front of scientific papers which recognize
the limitations of animal models and their perceived importance at the same
time, depending on the mechanisms investigated. As previously noted, the
choice of renouncing animal experiments in favor of non-animal methods is
fundamentally a political choice; this choice should be accompanied by the
development of infrastructures and programs to serve as incentives for sci
entific advancement, and by a new ethos of the scientific community. While
these needs have been previously recognized by authors defining animal use
as poor science (e.g., Lafollette and Shanks, 1996; Greek and Greek, 2003), it is
also important to recognize the political nature of the category of necessity in
the experimental practice.
A political critique of animal use strives to substitute the epistemic and
ethical culture of animal experiments with a culture of compassion and soli
darity, independent of the species-belonging. A political critique of animal ex
perimentation rejects the fundamental subjugation of animal interests "just
because they are animals" and openly argues for the establishment of a differ
ent ethical culture. In order to be effective, the political critique must admit
that it is necessary to give up certain pathways to knowledge while, at the
same time, establishing a system in which it is possible to research and de
velop technologies without violating the fundamental interests and rights of
animals.
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